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This paper discusses a restriction of quantum theory, in which very complex states would be
excluded. The toy theory is phrased in the language of the circuit model for quantum computing,
its key ingredient being a limitation on the number of interactions that each qubit may undergo.
As long as one stays in the circuit model, the toy theory is consistent and may even match what we
shall be ever able to do in a controlled laboratory experiment. The direct extension of the restriction
beyond the circuit model conflicts with observed facts: the possibility of restricting the complexity
of quantum state, while saving phenomena, remains an open question.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early days, physicists have faced the task
of explaining why quantum theories don’t seem to mat-
ter for the objects of our everyday experience. Nowa-
days, there are two well-established routes for an effec-
tive quantum-to-classical transition: decoherence and
coarse graining. The possibility of more radical routes
has been rather dormant for some years, confined to the
small community studying spontaneous collapse mod-
els, but is now getting new momentum, since it is very
often mentioned as a motivation for the experimental
tests of quantum effects with large objects [1, 2]. This
paper shares in the idea that something radical may
happen in the quantum-to-classical transition, but ex-
plores a different path than spontaneous collapse.
The size of the system is the first possible critical
parameter that comes to mind. Size definitely sets
strong limitations to the activity of the physicist: none
of us will ever write down the most general state of
a few hundred of qubits, since 2265 ≈ 1080 is the es-
timated number of atoms in the observable universe.
Beyond these practical considerations, however, sheer
size does not say much about degrees of freedom. For
instance, the observation of an interference fringe for
matter waves herald superposition of a single degree of
freedom, the centre of mass, irrespective of how mas-
sive the system actually is. Though not logically ab-
surd, in face of the evidence collected so far it is hard
to conceive that a single degree of freedom be not de-
scribed by quantum physics. For such delocalisation
experiments, some invoke decoherence due to gravity:
this would wash out spatial interference indeed, but
would not erase the effects of superposition of other de-
grees of freedom — a dead cat looks pretty much the
same as a sleeping one from a gravitational perspec-
tive, so a superposition of the two possibilities would
not be decohered by that mechanism [14].
If quantum theory has to fail somewhere on the route
from microscopic entities to the scale of our everyday
experience, rather than size, it may be preferable to
invoke some definition of complexity. In recent years,
the possibility that very complex states predicted by
quantum theory may not exist in nature has been put
forward to cast doubts on the feasibility of quantum
computing. In an attempt to bring the debate onto
more rational ground than simple suspicion, Aaronson
proposed a quantitative way of defining which families
of multipartite states deserve the label of “complex”
[3, 4]. However, to my knowledge nobody has tried
to describe how a theory of interacting systems would
look like, that matches quantum theory in “simple”
situations and deviate from it in “complex” ones [15].
This paper describes such a toy theory.
II. THE TOY THEORY
A. Definition and general properties
The toy theory is defined in the framework of the
circuit model for quantum computation. It is as-
sumed that each degree of freedom is a qubit, and that
the possible gates are any single-qubit rotations and
CNOTs for the interactions. As widely known, this is
one of the possible sets that leads to universal quan-
tum computing. The toy theory achieves its goal by
limiting the number of two-qubit interactions that each
qubit can undergo. No constraints are imposed on the
other two elements of the circuit model, single-qubit
rotations and single-qubit destructive measurements.
Specifically, let us say that each qubit can take part
in at most K CNOT gates, either as control or as tar-
get. If a CNOT gate involves a qubit that has already
undergone K previous ones, it simply won’t act and
the state will be left unchanged.
Before attempting a more quantitative discussion of
what this toy theory can do, and in particular to which
extent it reproduces quantum theory and when it starts
departing from it, let me make a few qualitative obser-
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The first important observation is that the toy theory
is a restriction on ordinary quantum theory and can be
simulated within it. For instance, one may append to
each qubit a register with K + 1 orthogonal states,
initialised in the state k = 0. Then, the action of
two-qubit gates is conditioned on the value k of the
register: if k < K for both qubits, the gate acts as
a CNOT, and the register of both qubits is shifted as
k → k + 1; if one of the qubits has k = K, the gate
acts as the identity and the registers are unchanged.
This observation shows that the toy theory cannot have
any of the inconsistencies that often plague attempts
at modifying quantum theory. In particular, the no-
signalling feature is respected, as should be obvious
from the fact that the action of each gate depends only
on the state of the two interacting systems.
Besides, as soon as K ≥ 2, the theory allows the
creation of the GHZ state of arbitrarily many qubits.
This state is generally considered as the paradigm of
“macroscopic superposition” [5]. Thus, no restriction
is induced on the number of qubits that can become en-
tangled, only on the type of many-qubit entanglement
that can be created.
The most striking departure of the toy theory from
accepted postulates is the fact that the dynamics of
isolated systems is no longer fully reversible. In fact,
the dynamics can be reversed if and only if each of the
qubits has participated in at most K/2 CNOTs (as-
suming that circuits are optimally designed). Notice
that, even when it becomes impossible to revert to a
previous state, a pure state remains a pure state. This
is very different from the kind of irreversibility that
would be called “collapse”. In fact, just like in the
circuit model of quantum computing, measurement is
going to be treated as a primitive: this toy theory does
not have a measurement theory and is making no at-
tempt at solving a hypothetical measurement problem,
which exists only in some classes of interpretations —
more generally, the toy theory is agnostic as to whether
states should be interpreted in an epistemic or an ontic
way [6].
B. Why me? [M. Balotelli, public
communication]
This is the toy theory we are going to work with. Of
course, once the Pandora box is open, one may think
of many variations, and indeed it is the main goal of
this paper to stimulate such a reflection. Here are some
thoughts on the matter:
• The option that the interaction may become triv-
ial only if both qubits have k = K is of some inter-
est and will be quickly mentioned later (Section
V). This variation would share the same qualita-
tive features just described, and for a given value
of K would recover more of quantum theory.
• Instead of restricting the interactions, one may
restrict directly the amount of entanglement or of
complexity, defined according to one’s favourite
measure, and see what it implies on the dynam-
ics. Aaronson’s idea of tree size complexity, men-
tioned above, would fit here. I’ll discuss in the
technical part (paragraph III C) why the toy the-
ory discussed here does not have a strong link
with Aaronson’s tree size complexity.
• In the same vein, for some time I toyed with the
idea of restricting simply the number of qubits
that can be entangled, but I was stopped by what
I consider a major obstacle. Consider the case,
where an entangled state of the largest allowed
number of qubits has been prepared: one must
be able to describe what happens if one of those
qubits (call it Q) is brought in interaction with
a new one. Now, whichever ad hoc recipe one
may invent, it must rely on information that is
not locally available: indeed, Q must know to be
part of a how-many-qubit entangled state, which
is obviously not the same as knowing with how
many qubits it has interacted directly.
III. TUNING THE VALUE OF K
One of the nice features of the toy theory is the tune-
able parameterK. For K = 1, the theory allows qubits
to get entangled only by pairs, after which one can
only rotate and measure them: besides violating Bell
inequalities, there is little one can do with that. For
K = 2, the theory already allows entangling arbitrarily
many qubits, at least in the GHZ state. For K → ∞
the toy theory is the standard circuit model for quan-
tum computing.
This raises the curiosity of knowing what the theory
can and cannot do for a given value of K. This section
is devoted to a first exploration of this question.
A. The threat for public key encryption
As a simple warm up, let us see what value of K
one should set for Shor’s algorithm to be able to break
current public key encryption schemes. Clearly, the
circuit depth provides an upper bound on K, which
would be tight if at least one of the qubits participates
in a CNOT at every step.
3Now, in order to factor an integer of n bits, Shor’s
algorithm requires at most 2n+3 logical qubits, with a
circuit depth whose leading term is 32n3 [7, 8]. In order
to compromise the RSA encryption based on n = 2048,
one needs K & 238 (assuming that each logical qubit is
encoded in one physical qubit; a larger bound would be
obtained if one considers fault-tolerant architectures).
B. Reproducing all of QM up to n qubits
A natural set of interesting values of K are the
thresholds Kn, defined as the minimal value of K for
which the toy theory can create all pure states of n
qubits, starting from the product |0〉⊗n. Bounds on
Kn (which, we recall, is a number of CNOTs per qubit)
can be inferred from bounds on the total number of
CNOT gates required to create an arbitrary n-qubit
state, which have been the object of several studies.
A lower bound on Kn is readily obtained. Indeed, by
counting parameters, one finds that at least Ktotaln ≥
1
2 (2
n − n − 1) CNOT gates in the whole circuit are
needed if one wants to create any n-qubit pure state
(see e.g. Section II of [10]). Thus each qubit must take
part in at least Ktotaln /(n/2) such gates, whence
Kn ≥ KLn =
⌈
2n − 1
n
⌉
− 1 . (1)
Tight circuits are known for K2 = K
L
2 = 1 and K3 =
KL3 = 2 [9]. Already for n = 4, the lower bound is
KL4 = 3 but the best known circuit has 4 CNOTs on
all qubits (Fig. 1 of [10], improved by an observation
made in Appendix E of [11]).
As we said above, an upper bound on K is given by
the circuit depth: in this case, we need the depth of a
circuit capable of producing all states of n qubits from
product ones. To date, the best known such bound is
the one provided by Plesch and Brukner [10]:
Kn ≤ KUn = ⌈c 2n⌉ (2)
with c = 2348 .
The gap between these lower and upper bounds
grows with n, since KUn /K
L
n ≈ n2 . Just to have
some numerical values to fix the ideas, we note that
102 ≤ K10 ≤ 491, 52428 ≤ K20 ≤ 502443. Also, even
if it is obvious that such must be the case, it is impres-
sive to note the difference between implementing the
Shor’s algorithm and realising the most general state
of the same number of qubits: referring to the numbers
cited in paragraph IIIA, K2×2048+3 ∼ 24100 ≫ 238.
C. K and tree-size complexity
Just a short paragraph to stress that there is no di-
rect relation between Aaronson’s tree-size complexity
and the states that are forbidden in the toy theory
once a value of K is chosen. The reason is twofold.
First, usually the question one asks in the context of
tree size is not whether a state is “highly complex” for
a given number of qubits: rather, one asks if the tree
size increases super-polynomially with n for a given
family of states. Second, tree size complexity does not
imply high circuit complexity: Aaronson proved super-
polynomial tree size for the so-called sub-group states
and (up to a technical conjecture) for the states that
appear in Shor’s algorithm; both families can be re-
alised with a polynomial number of CNOT gates.
Now, the toy theory constrains circuit complexity,
the constraints on state complexity being only a con-
sequence. Since it would make no sense to allow K to
depend on the number n of qubits that are considered
part of the “system”, the number of CNOT gates in
the circuit cannot increase more than linearly with n
and is bounded by Kn/2.
IV. THE QUANTUM-TO-CLASSICAL
TRANSITION
As we said above, the toy theory does not even try
to solve the measurement problem, assuming there is
one. However, it would be pleasant to check that clas-
sicality can be recovered along both usual routes. The
route through coarse graining is certainly viable, be-
cause it amounts at introducing some imperfections in
the measurement devices or in the devices that store
the measurement results. The route through decoher-
ence is more tricky, since the toy theory restricts the in-
teractions, and these restrictions should not depend on
whether the qubit is interacting with another qubit in
the “system” or with a qubit of the “environment”. In
the extreme case, once a qubit has interacted through
K CNOTs, its state is frozen up to local rotations. So,
the theory does put limits to decoherence. However,
we are going to see on an example that decoherence is
very effective and “consumes” a small number of inter-
actions.
To stay within the circuit model, we consider a bath
of qubits, i.e. a large number of uncorrelated qubits
each in the state σT = p|0〉〈0| + (1 − p)|1〉〈1|. The
creation of the bath itself is trivial within the toy
theory: with just one CNOT acting on each qubit,
one can prepare two qubits in the entangled state√
p|00〉+√1− p|11〉; one is taken to form part of the
bath, the other one is not used.
4The effectiveness of decoherence can be seen by
using a thermalisation channel tailored for the cir-
cuit approach [12]. Each qubit of the system inter-
acts sequentially with one qubit of the bath after an-
other. The interaction is a partial swap parametrised
by cosφ, such that cosφ = 1 means no interaction
while cosφ = 0 represents the case in which the sys-
tem qubit is dumped as such into the bath and replaced
by a bath qubit in a single step. Intermediate values of
cosφ lead to a more or less gentle thermalisation pro-
cess; thus a large value of cosφ may be preferable on
physical grounds.
The key point is that the convergence of state of
the system ρ(m) towards σT is exponential in the num-
ber of interactions m. In terms of trace distance, the
channel gives ||ρ(m) − σT ||1 ≤ (cosφ)m [16]. Thus,
the state of each system qubit can be thermalised to
a precision ||ρ(m) − σT ||1 ≤ ε after interacting with at
most m = log ε/ log(cosφ) qubits of the bath. Since
each partial swap can be implemented with 3 CNOTs,
thermalisation can be guaranteed if one allows
KT (ε, φ) ≤ 3 log ε
log(cosφ)
(3)
CNOT gates to act on the system qubit. The channel
under study was not chosen as to minimise K, so this
result is only an upper bound.
For the sake of the example, with cosφ = 0.99
one finds KT (ε) ≈ 687 log10 1ε : that is, each digit of
precision in thermalisation costs some 700 additional
CNOTs, which is of the order ofKn=11. In other words,
if we choose K so that quantum theory is exact for at
least a couple of tens of qubits, thermalisation comes
basically for free.
V. BEYOND THE QUBIT CIRCUIT MODEL
This sections contains a few remarks about the
(im)possibility of extending the current toy theory be-
yond the circuit model with qubits.
A. Circuits with higher-dimensional systems
Staying first with circuit models, one may ask how
to generalise the prescription of the toy theory if the el-
ementary systems are taken to be higher-dimensional.
One may be initially tempted to fall back by exploit-
ing the obvious mathematical fact that any system of
finite dimension d can be mapped into log2 d qubits.
However, if we take that path, even single-qudit uni-
taries would no longer come for free. The reason is
clear: once the state of the qudit is encoded in qubits,
a generic single-qudit rotation involves the preparation
of entangled state; thence, it require CNOTs.
It seems therefore more appropriate to consider that
each degree of freedom has a proper dimension d (it is
a local prescription). Single-system unitaries and mea-
surements can then always be considered free resources,
while the number of interactions can be bounded by
Kd. The choice of Kd is not indifferent. If Kd grows
enough fast with d, for instance, the toy theory may
lead to an intriguing “reverse simulation” of quan-
tum computing: all the algorithms, which would be
off-boundary for qubits because of the value of Kd=2,
would become feasible by mapping the qubits into qu-
dits.
B. Measurement-based quantum computation
With K = 3 CNOT gates (actually, phase gates) per
qubit, one can create the cluster state on a hexagonal
lattice, which is known to be universal for quantum
computing in the measurement-based model [13]. The
price to pay is in number of qubits. Consider an algo-
rithm that, in the circuit model, acts on n qubits and
requires m CNOT gates in total: in order to imple-
ment that algorithm one needs a cluster state of O(nm)
qubits, whose preparation requires just as many phase
gates: the total number of required CNOT gates basi-
cally does not change between the two models.
Thus, if one stays with the prescription of the
current toy theory but introduces algorithms in the
measurement-based model, and if the number of qubits
is in unlimited supply (as tacitly assumed above), the
current toy theory becomes trivial for K ≥ 3. Surely,
in order to obtain all states of n qubits, one would
need a cluster state of O(n 2n) qubits, and as noticed
above this number becomes comparable to the num-
ber of atoms in the whole visible universe when n is a
couple of hundreds.
C. Interactions
For an extension to any physical system, the finite
set of discrete-time interactions of the circuit model
will have to be replaced by a continuous set of con-
tinuous time interactions. In this view, a reasonable
generalisation may pass through imposing a limit on
the action that can be spent in interactions, i.e. a
bound of the type Jt ≤ K~ with J the strength of
the interaction Hamiltonian and t the time allowed. I
am doubtful whether it makes sense to embark in such
a generalisation: if one just looks at atoms, there is
no indication that electrons stop interacting with the
5nucleus after some time.
The previous observation may just be the last word.
For the sake of the reasoning, though, I find it inter-
esting to bring up another issue that may pass more
easily unnoticed. The circuit model, and in fact a lot
of simple quantum exercises, leave aside the fact that
single-qubit rotations and measurements are also inter-
actions : the first with an “external field”, the second
with a “measurement device”. If the spirit of the the-
ory is to limit interactions, one has to deal with this
issue. It would certainly undesirable to have a the-
ory in which, after some time, some systems cannot be
measured anymore because they have exhausted their
capacity of interaction!
Many solutions can be envisaged, but if we stay with
the toy theory as defined in the text, it seems to me
that they all pass through endowing “measurement de-
vices” with special features — something that may
be pleasant or unpleasant according to one’s preferred
philosophy, but ultimately one would have to identify
these special features in real devices. For instance, one
may define “measurement devices” by the power of re-
setting the register k to the initial value 0. This would
ensure that every system can always be measured, and
after being measured it can undergo a whole new series
of interactions (if the measurement was not destructive,
that is).
It is at this point that one may see the benefit of
the other version of the toy theory mentioned at the
end of Section II, in which interaction fails to hap-
pen only of both interacting systems have exhausted
their capacity of interaction. Indeed, both an “exter-
nal field” and a “measurement device” are almost by
definition “macroscopic” objects (and so would be a
thermal bath, to come back to the case of decoher-
ence discussed above). In this other version of the toy
theory, then, single-qubit rotations and measurements,
and decoherence, would remain virtually unaffected, as
long as one requires macroscopic objects to have a very
large K as compared to that of qubits. May a varia-
tion of this point of view save the observation about
electron-nuclei interactions made above?
VI. CONCLUSION
I have presented a toy theory that reproduces quan-
tum physics in several conditions but prevents the cre-
ation of states that are too complex. This is done by
limiting the number K of interactions that a system
may undergo. For any value of the parameter K, the
toy theory is in principle falsifiable. The possibility
of simulating the toy theory with standard quantum
mechanics guarantees that the theory is not plagued
by flagrant inconsistencies. The only radical departure
from accepted principles is the prediction of irreversible
dynamics for isolated systems (though in a way that
pure states remain pure, thus remaining compatible
with epistemic interpretations).
The foundations of this idea would become much
more solid if one could find a plausible reason to limit
the number of interactions: however, I don’t see any
such reason; worse, as noted above, it looks rather con-
tradicted by observed facts. Other more subtle modifi-
cations may lead to theories that differ from quantum
theory while agreeing on all observed facts — or maybe
a limitation of complexity will just prove inconsistent,
just as all attempts of taming quantum correlations in
a classical way have been doomed to failure so far [17].
The current toy theory should not be asked to do much
beyond its scope, which was to provide a first example
of what a theory with those features would look like.
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